

## Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 232061 TOSEC 140036

STADIS//////////

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT BONN 15901 ACTION SECSTATE 29 SEPT

QUOTE

S E C R E T BONN 15901

STADIS

EXDIS

EYES ONLY FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN FROM AMBASSA-  
DOR HILLENBRAND

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: GW, MILI, MBFR, NATO, MPOL

SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER DISCUSSIONS WITH LEBER

1. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER MET FOR ABOUT NINE HOURS  
YESTERDAY WITH MINISTER LEBER. ISA WILL PRESUMABLY BE  
GIVING YOU A REPORT OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

2. HOWEVER, BY WAY OF SUCH URGENT BACKGROUND INFORMA-  
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TION AS YOU MAY NEED FOR THE SVHMIDT VISIT I AM REPORT-

ING SOME HIGHLIGHTS BELOW. THOSE HIGHLIGHTS ONLY COVER THE FIVE HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN DELEGATIONS, AND NOT THE ALMOST FOUR HOURS OF PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE MINISTERS IN WHICH MAJOR GENERAL WICKHAM WAS THE ONLY OTHER AMERICAN PRESENT.

3. I ASSUME YOU HAVE ALREADY SEEN YESTERDAY'S US INFO CABLE REPORTING THE JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE HELD BY SCHLESINGER AND LEBER.

BRIGADE 76.

AT THE END OF THE MORNING DELEGATION'S SESSION, LEBER ANNOUNCED THAT HE AND SCHLESINGER HAD REACHED AGREEMENT IN THEIR PRIVATE TALKS TO STUDY HOW THE STATIONING FUNDS FOR BRIGADE 76 CAN BE TAKEN OUT OF THE UNSPENT CIRCA 300 MILLION D-MARKS OFFSET FUNDS. HE SAID THIS WOULD BE DONE TEMPORARILY IN ORDER TO GET BRIGADE 76 STARTED, AND THAT BOTH MINISTERS WOULD JOINTLY MAKE EFFORTS TO RETURN THE MONEY TO THE SEVENTH ARMY OUT OF NATO INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDS OR FROM SOME OTHER SOURCE.

STANDARDIZATION.

LEBER PRESSED HARD FOR CONCRETE PROGRESS. HE URGED DEVELOPMENT OF ALLIANCE-WIDE CONCEPT AND MISSION WITH COMMON MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. HE URGED SCHLESINGER TO TALK TO THE FRENCH AND TO TELL THEM THAT MORE MULTILATERAL RATHER THAN BILATERAL PROJECTS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED. HE SAID THIS IS WHAT THE GERMANS WERE TELLING THE FRENCH. AT THE VERY LEAST, LEBER SAID, WE SHOULD MOVE TO SOME CONCRETE STEPS LIKE IDENTICAL MUNITIONS CALIBERS.

SCHLESINGER AGREED WE SHOULD BE MORE CONCRETE AND SUGGESTED WE MOVE TOWARD PROTOTYPING AND COMPETITION AMONG PROTOTYPES. HE EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE THIRD COUNTRY EXPORT ISSUE POINTING OUT THAT THIS--AS WELL AS OUR WORLD-WIDE MILITARY OBLIGATIONS--COMPELLED  
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US TO EXPAND OUR REQUIREMENTS TO A DEGREE THAT NATO MIGHT FIND TOO COSTLY.

LEBER SAID THAT GERMANY WAS REVIEWING ITS ARMS EXPORTS POLICY AND THAT "THE POLICIES OF THIS GOVERNMENT WILL SOON NOT BE A PROBLEM".

MBFR.

LEBER EXPRESSED THE GERMAN RESERVATIONS FORCEFULLY. HE WARNED THAT, SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STARTED TWO YEARS AGO, WESTERN FORCES IN THE NATO AREA HAD ALREADY BEEN REDUCED UNILATERALLY. HE INSISTED THAT OPTION III SHOULD BE A ONE-TIME OFFER OF US NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION, NOT THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS. FOR THE EUROPEANS AND THE GERMANS, HE SAID, THERE MUST BE NO NATIONAL LIMITATIONS, NO REDUCTION OF EUROPEAN EQUIPMENT, AND NO REDUCTION OF EUROPEAN UNITS REPEAT UNITS. ( HE FAVORED THINNING OUT RATHER THAN ELIMINATING UNITS).

SCHLESINGER DIFFERED WITH LEBER'S APPRAISAL REGARDING THE DECLINING STRENGTH OF NATO BUT AGREED ABOUT THE DANGERS IMPLICIT IN MBFR. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS NO INTERNAL LOGIC TO OPTION III, ITS ONLY PURPOSE BEING TO GET THE ADEQUATE RESPONSE OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY FROM EAST GERMANY. HE SAID THAT WE DID NOT HAVE TO ACCEPT PROPOSALS THAT JEOPARDIZED OUR SECURITY, AND WERE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE A LONG TIME UNLESS AND UNTIL ACCEPTABLE PROPOSALS WERE FORTHCOMING.

AWACS.

SCHLESINGER EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE FRG MIGHT ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH THE AWACS PROGRAM. LEBER EXPRESSED AN INTEREST BUT SAID HE HOPED THAT OTHER EUROPEANS WOULD JOIN IN TO PREVENT ITS BECOMING SIMPLY A US-FRG MATTER. HE SAID WE SHOULD KEEP IN TOUCH ON THIS. SCHLESINGER WONDERED WHETHER THE ALLIANCE COULD ACT IN TIME.

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NIKE-HERCULES.

THERE WAS A LONG DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT GROWING OUT OF THE DPQ LETTER THAT SCHLESINGER HAD SENT TO LEBER.

DURING THAT DISCUSSION, SCHLESINGER STRESSED THE MARGINAL MILITARY VALUE OF THE NIKE-HERCULES. HE POINTED OUT THAT WE NOW HAVE MUCH BETTER WEAPONS FOR AIR DEFENSE, SUCH AS THE F-15 AND F-16, AND THAT WE ARE WORKING ON A SAM D SYSTEM THAT WILL BE VASTLY SUPERIOR. HE SAID THAT WE HAD TO MAKE OUR STRATEGIC DECISIONS ON THE BASIS OF OUR ANALYSIS OF OUR NEEDS RATHER THAN ON THE BASIS OF HISTORY. WHAT WE WANT, HE SAID, IS AN

UNAMBIGUOUS, WELL-PROTECTED, DISCRIMINATING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY WITH REAL DETERRENT VALUE. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE US WAS USING FIVE THOUSAND MEN TO PROTECT 45 NIKE-HERCULES BATTERIES, AND THAT THEY COULD BE BETTER USED ELSEWHERE. HE SUGGESTED THINNING OUT THE UNITS IF THEY COULD NOT BE COMPLETELY REMOVED.

LEBER STRESSED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL VALUE OF NIKE-HERCULES. HE SAID THAT A US ELIMINATION OF HIGH AND MEDIUM-LEVEL A-A EFFORT WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY THE DUTCH, LEAVING THE FRG TO DO IT ALONE. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE NIKE-HERCULES AND THE GENERAL POSITIONING OF THE US NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN EUROPE HAD AN IMPORTANT DETERRENT EFFECT BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT INITIATE A WAR WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND EAST GERMANY. THOSE COUNTRIES, HE SAID, WERE EFFECTIVELY RESTRAINED BY THE NUCLEAR FORCES.

LEBER SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO HASTY ACTION AND THAT A WAY COULD BE FOUND SLOWLY, AS THE FRG WAS PREPARED TO LOOK AT THIS IN A FLEXIBLE MANNER. SCHLESINGER SAID HE COULD REASSURE LEBER THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE HASTY SOLUTIONS.

CARRIER DEPLOYMENT.

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SCHLESINGER BRIEFLY POINTED OUT THAT ONE OF OUR TWO CARRIERS IN THE SIXTH FLEET WOULD BE DEPLOYED FROM TIME TO TIME WITH THE SECOND FLEET IN ORDER TO PATROL OFF NORWAY AND IN THE NORTH SEA. HE SAID NORWAY COULD BENEFIT FROM THIS SUPPORT, PERHAPS MORE THAN THE CONTINENTAL NATIONS. LEBER DID NOT CHALLENGE THIS ANALYSIS.

S-3A.

SCHLESINGER SAID THAT LOCKHEED HAD TOLD DOD THE PRODUCTION LINE WOULD BE TERMINATED IF NO GERMAN PURCHASE DECISION WERE MADE BY NOVEMBER 1 AND THAT THE SYSTEM WOULD COST MORE LATER. SCHLESINGER SAID THIS WAS THE INFORMATION HE HAD BEEN GIVEN AND HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO ADVISE THE GERMANS WHAT TO DO. STATE SECRETARY MANN, REPLYING FOR LEBER, SAID THE FRG HOPED TO MAKE A DECISION BY THEN BUT THERE WERE MANY PARLIAMENTARY HURDLES AHEAD WHICH MIGHT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE.

4. COMMENT: THE MOST NOTEWORTHY ELEMENT OF THE

DISCUSSION WAS OBVIOUSLY THE AGREEMENT TO PROCEED WITH

UNOBLIGATED OFFSET FUNDS TO COVER INITIAL BRIGADE 76  
DEPLOYMENT COSTS AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. THIS TAKES SOME  
URGENCY OUT OF THE ISSUE BUT IT WILL LEAVE UNRESOLVED  
WHAT WE DO ABOUT LATER OFFSET FUNDS, A QUESTION THAT  
SCHMIDT WILL PRESUMABLY BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH THE  
PRESIDENT. I ASSUME THAT, BY ACCEPTING THE GERMAN  
POSITION, WE ARE NOW A STEP NEARER TO BRIGADE 76  
DEPLOYMENT BUT THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY MANY OTHER COSTS TO  
COME. AS I URGED IN MY 15834 I HOPE YOU CAN KEEP US  
POSTED.

THE OTHER NOTABLE ELEMENT WAS LEBER'S SUGGESTION,  
WHICH HAS BEEN FORESHADOWED ELSEWHERE, THAT GERMANY  
MAY MOVE MORE ACTIVELY TO EXPORT ARMS. CURIOUSLY, THIS  
COINCIDES WITH THE DRIVE TO STANDARDIZATION, #SINCE BOTH  
STANDARDIZATION AND EXPORT AMBITIONS WILL MOVE THE  
GERMANS TO DEVELOP WEAPONS THAT ARE NOT EXCLUSIVELY  
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SUITED FOR EUROPEAN CONDITIONS. END COMMENT.  
HILLENBRAND UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

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